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National Assembly Act was revised in 2012 (So-called 
“National Assembly Advancement Act”) to prevent physical conflict 
and encourage cooperation and compromise between political 
parties. One of the critical points in the revision related to the 
budget deliberation of the National Assembly was article 85-3 
which introduced “the draft budget automatic introduction system 
(BAIS)”. Prior to the implementation of BAIS (before 2014), the 
comprehensive deliberations of the Special Committee on Budget 
and Accounts often continued to the end of the year, which violated 
article 54-2 of Korean Constitution requiring the National 
Assembly to finish the budget deliberation by December 2. To deal 
with the problem of breaching Constitution, BAIS of the National 
Assembly Act makes the draft budget refer to the plenary session 
automatically on December 1 unless the Special Committee on 
 ii 
Budget and Accounts finishes the budget deliberation by November 
30.  
Introduction of BAIS has been expected to weaken the power of 
the National Assembly related to budget deliberation by reducing 
the bargaining power of the opposition party. Since 2014 BAIS is 
predicted to allay concern about the provisional budget thanks to 
BAIS which can breaks the impasse over the draft budget in the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, and consequently gives 
an advantage to the government and ruling party in the negotiation 
on budget deliberation.  
Based on the empirical data such as the deliberation reports 
produced by the Special Committee on the Budget and Accounts, 
and the budget amendment in the plenary session, this study 
examined how the implementation of BAIS changed the power of 
the National Assembly to revise the draft budget and the patterns 
related to the practice of budget deliberations including the timing 
of budget passage, the fidelity of the budget deliberation, and the 
function of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts. 
First, this research collected and analyzed each year’s budget 
deliberation data from 2009 to 2018. This research tried to find the 
common patterns of budget deliberations from 2009 to 2013 
(before the implementation of BAIS) and those of budget 
deliberations from 2014 to 2018 (on and after BAIS).  Lastly, this 
research analyzed how and why common patterns of the budget 
deliberations from 2014 to 2018 changed after the implementation 
of BAIS, by comparing them with those from 2009 to 2013.  
According to the results of this research, although the BAIS has 
advanced the passage of the draft budget, it is still unable to make 
the National Assembly to meet the legal deadline. Furthermore, if 
the deadlock is sustained after the draft budget is introduced to the 
plenary session, the budget passage may be delayed again to the 
end of the year as in the past. Thus, the positive effect of the 
introduction of BAIS is very limited, while its side effects seem to 
be significant. 
In the case that the ruling party can secure a majority of seats 
 iii 
as in 2014 and 2015, the budget deliberation authority of the 
National Assembly and its function to check the executive branch in 
terms of the public finance had been weakened as the incentive of 
the ruling party to respect the opposite party’s opinions had been 
reduced. When the ruling party failed to hold a majority of seats, as 
in 2016, 2017 and 2018, BAIS did not seem to have much impact on 
the budget deliberation authority of the National Assembly, but it 
caused some side effects that have hampered the transparency and 
rationality of the budget deliberation as it incapacitated the function 
of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts and made the 
draft budget to be determined through informal and closed-door 
negotiations. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The purpose of research 
 
The National Assembly Act was revised in 2012 (So-called 
“National Assembly Advancement Act”) to prevent physical conflict 
and encourage cooperation and compromise between political 
parties. One of the critical points in the revision related to the 
budget deliberation of the National Assembly was article 85-3 
which introduced “the draft budget automatic introduction system” 
(BAIS). BAIS requires the draft budget1 to refer to the plenary 
session 2  automatically on December 1st, unless the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts 3  finishes the budget 
deliberation by November 30. 
Until recently, there have been several articles that discussed 
the influence of BAIS on the budget deliberation, but few studies 
have empirically analyzed influence of the introduction of BAIS on 
the budget deliberation at this point in time. Five years after the 
implementation of the system 4 , now is an appropriate time to 
comprehensively analyze the influence of BAIS based on empirical 
data. This study aims to empirically and comprehensively analyze 
the impact of the introduction of BAIS, a significant institutional 
change in the budget deliberation process, on the budget 
deliberations of the National Assembly. Based on the empirical data 
such as the deliberation reports produced by the Special Committee 
                                            
1 The draft budget means the budget proposal submitted by the government 
to the National Assembly but not approved by the National Assembly 
2 The plenary session means the meeting in which all members of the 
National Assembly participate to finally review legislative bills and the draft 
budget and to make the final decision of the National Assembly. 
3 The Special Committee on the Budget and Accounts, which conducts the 
comprehensive deliberation on the entire draft budget, is considered as the 
most important institution in the budget deliberation process because the 
total amount of the budget and the details of revisions to the draft budget 
are mainly determined in the comprehensive deliberation. 
4 According to the supplementary provision of the revised National 
Assembly Act in 2012, BAIS was implemented on May 30, 2014. 
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on the Budget and Accounts, and the budget amendment in the 
plenary session, this study would examine how the implementation 
of BAIS changed the power of the National Assembly to revise the 
draft budget and the patterns related to the practice of budget 
deliberations.  
To outline the procedure of analysis, this research would 
collect and analyze each year’s budget deliberation data from 2009 
to 2018 and, find the common patterns of budget deliberations from 
2009 to 2013 (before the implementation of BAIS) and those of 
budget deliberations from 2014 to 2018 (on and after BAIS). Then, 
this research would analyze how and why common patterns of the 
budget deliberations from 2014 to 2018 change after the 
implementation of BAIS by comparing them with those from 2009 to 
2013. 
The changes of the patterns of the budget deliberation would be 
analyzed in four aspects as follows. First, this research would trace 
the change of the Total Revision Rate (TRR) of Total Spending, 
which means the ratio of the absolute figure of the sum of reduced 
and increased amounts in the budget deliberation to the draft budget, 
to measure the change in the authority of the National Assembly to 
revise the draft budget. Second, this research would use “Passage 
Gap”, calculated by subtracting the legal dead line from the date 
when the draft budget was actually passed, to measure the degree 
of hastening the passage of the draft budget. Third, this research 
would measure the fidelity of the budget deliberation through the 
period and the number of meetings of the comprehensive 
deliberation of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts. 
Lastly, this research would judge whether BAIS incapacitated the 
function of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts based on 
whether the draft budget was automatically referred to the plenary 






1.2. The budget deliberation process of the National 
Assembly 
 
1.2.1. Submission of the draft budget to the National 
Assembly 
 
The government develops budgets and fund management plans 
for each fiscal year5. They are sent to the National Assembly by 
October 2, 90 days before the commencement of the next fiscal 
year, with the approval of the president after the Cabinet meeting. 
Total and net revenue and expenditure budget tables, project 
descriptions, Treasury debt commitments, performance plans for 
each department and gender-sensitive budget tables are included 
as supplementary documents to the draft budget. Fund management 
plans include fund-raising plans, estimated balance sheets and 
income statements, gross and net revenue and expenditure plans, 
performance plans, and gender-sensitive budget. 
Along with the budget, National Fiscal Management plan from 
the current fiscal year to 5 fiscal years is developed and submitted 
to the National Assembly. The draft National Financial Management 
Plan consists of the basic goals and direction of financial 
management, mid and long-term financial projections, sectoral 
resource allocation plans, and tax burden level. The National 
Finance Act, revised in April 2013, requires the draft budget to be 
submitted 90 days prior to the fiscal year in 2013, 100 days prior to 
the fiscal year in 2014, 110 days prior to the fiscal year in 2015, 
and 120 days prior to the fiscal year in 2016. 
                                            
5 The fiscal year of the government is from January 1st to December 31. 
 
 ４ 
<Table 1-1> Changes in date of Submission of the draft budget Draft 

















the fiscal year) 
 
 
1.2.2. Budget deliberation of the National Assembly. 
 
The National Assembly should finish the budget deliberation 30 
days prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year (January 1). The 
budget deliberation of the National Assembly consists of three 
steps: 
 
1. Preliminary deliberation of the Standing Committee 
    2. Comprehensive deliberation of the Special Committee on                 
Budget and Accounts 
3. Plenary session vote. 
 
Among the three steps, the comprehensive deliberation of the 
Special Committee on the Budget and Accounts is considered as the 
most important part because the total amount of the budget and the 
details of revisions to the draft budget are mainly determined in this 
phase (Kim, Nan-young & Kim Sang-hun, 2007). 
 
1.2.2.1. Administrative Policy Speech and the 
Preliminary Review of the Standing Committee 
 
At the plenary session, the president delivers an administrative 
policy speech related to the draft budget to the National Assembly. 
An administrative policy speech includes the main points and 
directions of the next year's draft budget, the overall government 
philosophy, and national development strategy. 
In the preliminary deliberations of the standing committee, each 
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minister proposes and explains the draft budget under his/her 
jurisdiction. Then, expert members of the National Assembly 
conduct briefing sessions. During this briefing session, expert 
members inform the rest of the committee of the summary of the 
draft budget, key issues, independent opinions on budget cuts, and 
comments on the budget. Then, the interpellation process and 
budget evaluation follow. Evaluations are usually conducted by 
subcommittees and results are confirmed by the general meeting of 
the standing committee. Since each standing committee has a 
jurisdiction in some specific ministries, it is likely to reflect specific 
interests in the budget deliberation process rather than public 
interest of the whole country. This makes the standing committee 
to have a tendency to increase the budget rather than decrease it. 
 
1.2.2.2. Comprehensive Deliberation of the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts 
 
The draft budget passed by each standing committee goes 
through a comprehensive deliberation of the Special Committee on 
Budget and Accounts. The special committee was a temporary 
organization by 1999, but Since 2000, it has become a permanent 
special committee composed of 50 members. While the term of 
members of the standing committee is two years, the term of 
members of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts is one 
year. 
The Special Committee on Budget and Accounts is becoming a 
key organization in the budget deliberation process. Preliminary 
deliberation of standing committees is a preparatory stage prior to a 
comprehensive deliberation, but the comprehensive deliberation of 
the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts is not bound by the 
results of the preliminary deliberation. To make up for this, the 
National Assembly Act requires the Special Committee on Budget 
and Accounts to generally respect the results of its preliminary 
deliberation of the standing committee and obtain approval from the 
standing committee when it cancels budget cuts in the preliminary 
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deliberation or makes new budget item.  
On the first day of comprehensive deliberation of the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts, the Minister of Strategy and 
Finance explains the background and emphasis of the budget, the 
direction of allocation of funds, and the overall structure of the 
budget. Subsequently, the expert member of the committee 
presents his/her own view including the summary of the draft 
budget, key issues, independent opinions on budget cuts, and 
comments on the budget. Next, the comprehensive policy 
questioning session is held with all ministers and executives. After 
the comprehensive policy questioning session is completed, the 
departmental evaluation is conducted for a more detailed 
examination. The departmental evaluation is divided into the 
examination on economic ministries and the examination on non-
economic ministries. 
On the last day of the committee's meeting, the committee 
forms the budget adjustment subcommittee consisting of about ten 
members to adjust the budget figures. The subcommittees adjust 
the budget by considering the results of preliminary deliberation, 
the comprehensive policy questioning session, and the departmental 
evaluation. The adjusted budget by the subcommittee is confirmed 
in the general meeting of the Special Committee on Budget and 
Accounts. 
 
1.2.2.3. Plenary Session Vote 
 
The draft budget, passed in the Special Committee on Budget 
and Accounts, is introduced to the plenary session and confirmed as 
the budget for the next fiscal year through the discussion and vote.  
Article 57 of the Constitution prohibits the National Assembly from 
increasing budget or making new budget items without the consent 
of the government. In addition, the Constitution requires the draft 
budget to be determined by December 2nd, thirty days before the 
commencement of the next fiscal year. If the budget is not finalized 
before the commencement of the fiscal year, the provisional budget 
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is drawn up. the provisional budget only allows the government to 
spend on the maintenance and operation of the institutions and 
facilities established by laws, or the performance of expenditure 
duties by laws (article 54-3 of the Constitution). 
 
1.3. Background of Revision of the National Assembly 
Act and Introduction of BAIS in 2012 
 
By the 18th National Assembly (from 2008 to 2012), the 
National Assembly Act had enabled the majority party to handle the 
bill and the draft budget unilaterally, despite the opposition from 
other parties. When the bills or the draft budget were in gridlock in 
the Standing Committee or the Special Committee on Budget and 
Accounts, the Speaker of the National Assembly from the majority 
party6 could directly introduce them to the plenary session, which 
enabled the majority party to pass them single-handed. 
The minority party which lacked legitimate means to deter the 
majority party from passing bills and the draft budget unilaterally, 
often used the physical force including occupying the plenary 
chamber. There was intensive violence between the ruling party 
members who attempted to enter the plenary chamber and the 
opposition party members who blocked them, which made the media 
give a nickname “the Animal National Assembly”. In particular, the 
violence in the 2010 budget deliberation made each party to accuse 
the other party and caused a serious deterioration of public 
confidence in the National Assembly. 
From the reflection on the violence, the National Assembly 
passed the revised National Assembly Act on May 2012 to prevent 
the recurrence of violence in the National Assembly and promote 
cooperation between parties. The revised act provided minority 
parties with legitimate means to delay a law-making process, 
including introduction of the supermajority of three-fifths and the 
                                            
6 According to the National Assembly Act, the Speaker of the National 




filibuster. At the same time, it adopted BAIS favorable to the 
majority party in order to balance with the establishment of delay 
measures for the minority.  
Prior to the implementation of BAIS(before 2014), the ruling 
party 7  and the opposition party usually conflict in “the 
comprehensive deliberation” of the Special Committee on Budget 
and Accounts since the extent and details of changes to the budget 
are decided in this phase(Kim, Nan-young & Kim Sang-hun, 2007). 
As a result, the comprehensive deliberations often continued to the 
end of the year, which violated article 54-2 of the Korean 
Constitution, requiring the National Assembly to finish the budget 
deliberations by December 2nd.  
Because the president of Korea has a powerful influence on the 
ruling party, and political parties in Korea have a strong discipline 
for their members of the National Assembly (Kang Won-taek, 
2001; Kwak Jin-young, 2003; Lee Jun-han, 2004; Jung Jin-min, 
2008; Jung Jin-wung, 2018), the president would control the ruling 
party in order to efficiently implement policies of the executive 
branch. The ruling party, which is under the influence of the 
president and can reflect its budget demand in the draft budget of 
the government, tries to minimize the revisions to the draft budget 
in the budget deliberation process. On the other hand, the opposition 
party which want to frustrate the president’s agenda and to use the 
budget deliberation as a tool for negotiation, struggles to revise the 
draft budget as much as possible. The conflicting interests between 
parties which have strong discipline, and the strong influence of the 
president on the ruling party make it difficult to form moderates in 
each party that can promote compromise, which leads to an extreme 
conflict in the comprehensive deliberation and the violation of the 
constitutional deadline (Kim Yong-man, 2012; Jung Jin-wung, 
2018). 
When budget deliberation of the Special Committee on Budget 
                                            
7 The ruling party means the party to which the president belongs. 




and Accounts was in gridlock till the end of the year, the 
government and ruling party could not help making concessions to 
the opposition party, because they wanted to avoid to the situation 
where “the provisional budget” is drawn up. It is drawn up when the 
budget is not decided before the commencement of the fiscal year 
(January 1st), and only allows the government to spend on the 
maintenance and operation of the institutions and facilities 
established by laws, or the performance of expenditure duties by 
laws(article 54-3 of the Constitution). On the other hand, since 
2014, BAIS is predicted to allay concern about the provisional 
budget. BAIS breaks the impasse over the draft budget in the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, and consequently gives 
an advantage to the government and ruling party in the negotiation 
on budget deliberation.  
To sum up, the revised National Assembly Act in 2012 gave the 
minority party the right to delay the legislative deliberation in order 
to prevent physical conflicts, while giving the majority the way to 
handle the budget swiftly. Thus, it enabled the majority to make a 
compromise with the minority by using its advantageous position on 
the budget even though the minority intensively opposes to the 







Chapter 2. A Discussion of Theory and Precedent 
Study Review 
 
2.1. Discussion of theory of the budget process of the 
National Assembly 
 
2.1.1. Budget process and the common pool resource 
problem 
 
Budget has a characteristic that payers, beneficiaries, and 
decision makers are all different (Kang, Hye-won & Ha, Yeon-
seob, 2016). While interest groups actively participate in the 
budgeting process to pursue their special interests or contain 
potential costs, taxpayers are “rationally ignorant” to the budget 
process because the costs of acquiring information and taking action 
to oppose government spending in favor of special interests 
outweigh those they actually pay (Downs, 1960). Politicians 
seeking reelection respond to the interests of constituents or 
influential interest groups. Thus, there is always the possibility of 
“cliental politics” and “entrepreneurial politics” (Wilson, 1974). 
Many scholars have identified this problem in the budget 
process as "the common pool resource problem". This is because 
the budget has properties of common goods characterized by 
rivalness and non-excludability in terms of consumption. Common 
goods have many users and finite resources, and are likely to be 
depleted from overuse (Schick, 2002). Because of rivalness, 
consuming the limited resources as much as possible is the best 
strategy to maximize one’s profits. If all individuals do in this way, 
the common goods will eventually be depleted and no one will be 
able to use it. Thus, the tragedy of the commons is a kind of 
collective dilemma in which the pursuit of self-interest does not 
guarantee the maximization of collective interest (Kang, Hye-won., 
Ha, Yeon-seob. 2016). 
Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen (1981) provided a theoretical 
framework for the common pool resource problem caused by 
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politicians in parliamentary budget process. Their theory is 
characterized by “1/n law”. Assuming that a government spending 
program provides benefits only to a particular constituency, the 
cost of the spending program is shared by all constituencies (n). In 
other words, the constituency can enjoy all the benefits while 
paying 1/n of supply costs. This means that politicians, decision-
makers in the budget process, do not internalize the total cost of 
expenditures, which brings about the pro-spending bias of 
politicians during the budget deliberation process. 
 
2.1.2. Discussion and precedent study of the budget 
deliberation of the National Assembly 
 
The budget deliberation, the fundamental function of the 
National Assembly which represent the people as a taxpayer, 
promotes the check-and-balance between legislative and 
executive branches, and contributes to the realization of the fiscal 
democracy in the modern state where the executive power is 
oversized (Park, Myeong-ho, 2011). Article 54 (1) of the 
Constitution clarify that the National Assembly has the right to 
make the final decision on the national finance by stipulating that 
“the National Assembly deliberates and determines the national 
budget”. 
However, it may not be appropriate to recognize the budget 
deliberation process as a confrontation between the government and 
the National Assembly. The dichotomous paradigm between 
legislative and executive branches excludes the role of political 
parties, the central mechanism in modern representative politics, 
and makes it difficult to explain the actual relationship between the 
administration and the parliament (King, 1990). King(1990) 
categorized various forms of relations between the parliament and 
the executive. King pointed that the intraparty mode(cabinet vs. 
members of the ruling party), the interparty mode(cabinet vs. the 
opposition party), and the non-party mode(cabinet vs. parliament) 
appeared in  the United Kingdom and France. He added that 
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interparty mode and cross-party mode were found in Germany due 
to its coalition government. 
Korea's parliamentary-administrative relationship can be 
interpreted as a partisan parliamentary-administrative relationship 
in which the National Assembly is divided into ruling and opposition 
parties, and the ruling party teams up with the president while the 
opposition party conflicts with them (Shin, Myeong-soon, 1993; 
Park, Chan-pyo, 2002). The ruling party does not check the 
president as a member of the legislative branch, but rather actively 
supports him. Whereas the opposition party consistently opposes to 
the president, which often exceeds the level of the reasonable 
check on him. The Korean parliamentary-administrative 
relationship can be understood more realistically when the medium 
of parties is inserted between the National Assembly and the 
administration (Park, Myeong-ho, 2011). 
If the budget deliberation process of the National Assembly is 
understood from this perspective, the ruling party has the incentive 
to minimize revision to the draft budget approved by the president 
while the opposition party tries to expand the amount of budget 
revisions. Thus, the revisions to the budget are led by the 
opposition party. If the power of the budget deliberation of the 
National Assembly is measured by the scale of the budget revisions, 
the power depends on the relative influence and bargaining power 
of the opposition party to the government and the ruling party. 
Many precedent studies evaluated that the power of the 
National Assembly on the budget deliberation was not strong. Jang, 
Moon-sun & Yoon, Sung-sik (2002) pointed out that the average 
revision rate of the National Assembly to the draft budget was only 
0.4%. Kim, Sang-hun, Lee, Gi-young (2001) argued that the 
budget deliberation of the National Assembly had been conducted 
perfunctorily, quoting that the average net revision rate to the draft 
budget was only 0.49% and the average total revision rate was 
1.8% from 1982 to 2010. One of the primary source constraining 
the power of the National Assembly on the budget deliberation is 
the government’s right to consent to the budget increase (Choo, 
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Yong- shik & Lee, Seung-hyun 2017). Article 57 of the 
Constitution prohibits the National Assembly from increasing an 
existing budget item or from creating a new budget item without the 
consent of the government. Consequently, the extent of budget 
revisions is limited by the extent of the government's consent. 
Looking at precedent studies on factors affecting the budget 
deliberation of the National Assembly, Kim Sung-cheol, Jang 
Seok-young, & Kang Yeo-jin (2000) analyzed 75 editorials of two 
newspapers related to budget deliberations from 1990 to 1998. 
This study found that various factors affected the budget 
deliberation in order of the lawmakers' behaviors, institutional 
factors, temporal factors, professionalism, and the control of the 
administration. 
Kim In-cheol, Kang Moon-hee, & Kim Doo-hyun (2002) 
compared the reduction rate, increase rate, and total revision rate 
of the draft budget from 1965 to 2000. As a result of the study, the 
larger the scale of budget and the increase of the standing 
committees compared to the previous year, the greater the 
tendency of the National Assembly to revise the draft budget. 
According to this study, the more cautious behavior toward the 
budget revisions was found when the lawmakers, who were 
professional and free from interests, actively communicated with 
the administration. As the proportion of ruling and opposition 
parties was similar, or political tension between them increased, the 
reduction rate and increase rate largely changed. 
Jang Moon-sun, Yoon Sung-sik (2002) analyzed the general 
account and special account reviewed by the Special Committee on 
Budget and Accounts for 25 years from 1972 to 1998(excluding 
1973 and 1981) to figure out the factors influencing the budget 
deliberation. The result of this study showed that only the ratio of 
ruling party members (-) was significant, which implied the 
excessive political motivation of Korea's budget deliberation. 
Park, Gyeong-don (2009) analyzed stenographic records of 
Finance and Economy Committee and Health and Welfare 
Committee of the 17th National Assembly to find out the factors 
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that influence the budget deliberation. In the case of Finance and 
Economy Committee, more discussions related to conflict, internal 
harmony, voting procedures, and deliberations had a negative 
impact on the passage of the budget, whereas as the more active 
this discussion, the more positive the impact on the budget-related 
decisions in Health and Welfare Committee. These findings suggest 
that the factors affecting the budget deliberation may differ 
depending on the characteristic of the committee. 
Seo, In-seok,. Lee, Dong-gyu,. Park, Hyeong-jun (2010) 
analyzed stenographic records of the standing committee which 
deliberated the water resources project in the 2009 draft budget. 
This study concluded that expertise was more influential on the 
budget deliberation than formality or authority. In addition, it 
conducted a regression analysis of factors found in stenographic 
records, and argued that compromise, professionalism, and 
representativeness had strong impact on the budget decision 
making. It also argued that partisanship and solidarity were 
significant, but their impacts were not large. 
Kim, Tae-jin (2013) analyzed the factors which affected the 
budget deliberation process of the 17th and 18th National Assembly, 
focusing on supporting organizations including the National 
Assembly Budget Office, staffs of the standing committees and the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts. The results of this 
study showed that the greater the share of the ruling party and the 
remaining terms of the president, the higher the possibility of 
budget increase. 
 
2.2. New institutionalism and institutional change 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of the 
introduction of BAIS, a significant institutional change in the 
parliamentary budget process, on the budget deliberation of the 
National Assembly from various perspectives. In this regard, this 
chapter would examine the theoretical background of the concept of 
the institution and institutional change, focusing on the new 
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institutionalism, and review precedent studies related to the impact 
of the introduction of BAIS.  
 
2.2.1. Overview of new institutionalism 
 
A school of thought setting up “institutions” as the central 
concept in describing political, economic and social phenomena is 
collectively called “new institutionalism”. New institutionalism 
emphasizes the importance of “context” in explaining politics, 
economics and social phenomena, and this context means 
institutions. Institutions are structural constraints that affect 
individual behavior. Human actions under the influence of 
institutions have stability and regularity. If institutions exist, 
individual actions or interactions between individuals are not 
random but show a certain pattern and predictability. New 
institutionalism can be divided into three branches: historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism. Three branches take different positions on 
understanding of individual behavior and power relations, and the 
process of institutional formation (Ha, Yeon-seob, 2011). 
Historical institutionalism mainly focuses on the formal aspects 
of the institution, and regards that institutions have a significant 
impact not only on the formation of actors' strategies, but also on 
the development of actors' preferences. The definition of 'the 
institution' in historical institutionalism generally includes all 
institutions that influence the definition of the interests of the actors 
and structure the power relations between them (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992). Historical institutionalism emphasizes that the 
shape of the institution varies depending on how the power 
relationship between members of the society takes shape, and the 
power relationship between groups changes according to the 
formation and operation patterns of specific institutions. In 
explaining the process of institutional formation and change, it 
emphasizes the coincidence and path dependency of history. 
Historical institutionalism puts stress on the combination of complex 
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and diverse factors in explaining causality, and emphasizes that 
causality between variables is always formed in context. In addition, 
it argues the combinations of the same variables can produce 
completely different results depending on the historical time point 
and the situation where these variables are combined. It puts 
emphasis on the external shock as a cause of institutional change. 
Rational choice institutionalism is based on the collective action 
dilemma in which each individual is rational and seeks self-interest, 
but the combined rationality of each individual at collective level can 
produce irrational results. The institution of rational choice 
institutionalism plays a role in resolving this dilemma. According to 
Shepsle (1989), institutions are proactive commitments between 
actors to facilitate mutual cooperation and maintain the agreement. 
The conscious design of institutions is a key concept of rational 
choice institutionalism. 
Rational choice institutionalism emphasizes equilibrium in that 
there is no incentive to change the individual's interaction pattern 
after solving the collective action dilemma. It puts stress on the role 
of the institution to maintain this equilibrium. Rational choice 
institutionalism focuses on each individual's strategic choices in 
explaining institutional and equilibrium changes. Institutions can be 
changed only if each individual’s benefit from the institutional 
change is greater than the cost, especially transaction costs 
(Weingast, 1996). 
According to sociological institutionalism, institutional form or 
procedure of a modern organization is introduced not because it is 
best suited for the efficient task performance, but because such an 
organizational form is the most appropriate under the existing 
cultural environment, which can increase external legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Sociological 
institutionalism focuses on informal aspects such as norms, cultures, 
symbolic systems, and meanings, especially on taken-for-granted 
beliefs and cognitive schemas, rather than the formal aspects of 
institutions. Institutional change is understood as a process to 
resemble a structure and function that are recognized as socially 
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appropriate and justified. 
 
2.2.2. Cause and effect of institutional change 
 
Historical institutionalism has emphasized external shocks such 
as war or panic as the cause of institutional change. It assumes that 
institutional change does not occur continuously and gradually, but 
rather very sharply and episodically. Also, historical institutionalism, 
unlike rational choice institutionalism, acknowledges the complexity 
of reality rather than intentionality in explaining institutional 
formation and change. In other words, even if an institution is 
formed or changed for the purpose of maintaining inequality in 
power relations, there is no guarantee that the institution is formed 
and changed as originally intended. Even though the institution has 
the intended shape, it can produce unintended consequences. 
Rational choice institutionalism explains that the main agent of 
institutional change is an individual, and such individuals change the 
institution when they judge that the benefits from the institutional 
change are greater than its costs. Therefore, in rational choice 
institutionalism, the process of institutional change is a conscious 
process. Unless the external environment changes, there is no 
reason for the parties engaged in the exchange to change the rules. 
However, the external environmental change can make the parties 
to try to change the rules because benefits that obtained under the 
current rules can change. If the additional benefit of establishing 
another rule is greater than its cost, the parties engaged in the 
transaction establish a new rule, which means institutional change 
(Knight, 2001). Knight (1992) noted the uncertainty surrounding 
institutional design and change, and emphasized unintended 
consequences. It is impossible to accurately predict the ultimate 
consequence of the institution in the phase of designing or trying to 
change it because the institution presents a new aspect while 
interacting with existing institutions and other social factors 
constantly. Due to this uncertainty and limited knowledge, each 
individual's ideology or belief plays a very important role in 
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designing or changing institutions. It is quite uncertain what 
outcome the chosen institution will produce over the long term, and 
in some cases one’s belief that a particular institution will bring 
him/her benefits may turn out to be wrong.  
In sociological institutionalism, if a new norm of behavior or 
organizational form emerges and gains legitimacy, the institution 
changes in the process of accepting this norm or organizational form. 
For this reason, the sociological institutionalism argues that the 
process of institutional change is not a process of conflict based on 
actors' interests, but a process of spreading new patterns of 
behaviors or organizations. Therefore, the process of institutional 
change appears as a process of isomorphism, imitation, and 
convergence. Once formed, the institution has the property to 
strengthen and maintain itself, inertia, even if there is no constant 
effort to justify and maintain it. De-institutionalization of this 
institution is caused by three factors: functional, political and social 
pressure (Oliver, 1992). 
According to sociological institutionalism, it is difficult for the 
newly designed institution to make intended consequences if it 
disaccords with the existing normative order, i.e. the informal 
institution (Cortell & Petersen, 2001). The informal and the formal 
institution do not change at the same time because the informal 
institution has a property that does not change easily. In particular, 
it is quite difficult for a change in the formal institution to make 
intended consequences when the informal and the formal institution 
conflict.  
 
2.2.3. New institutionalism and the introduction of 
BAIS 
 
BAIS was introduced with the agreement between the main 
actors of the budget deliberation, the ruling party, Saenuri Party and 
the opposition party, Democratic Party. Unlike historical 
institutionalism which emphasizes the power-oriented and 
accidental properties of institutional change, the introduction of 
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BAIS can be understood as what each party voluntarily and 
consciously changed the rules of the game to avoid losing people’s 
trust in the National Assembly and maximize the political interest of 
each party as the rational choice institutionalism explains. However, 
the external pressure should also be considered as an important 
cause of the introduction of BAIS. Social institutionalism explains 
that institutional change occurs when serious questions are raised 
about the effectiveness and legitimacy of institutionalized practices 
(political pressure). The severe violence that occurred in the 
budget deliberation process in 2010 had exceeded people’s patience, 
and provoked strong external pressures calling for the fundamental 
change in the budget deliberation practices, which lead to the 
introduction of BAIS. In other words, the introduction of BAIS is not 
only the response to external political pressures triggered by the 
violence in 2010, but also an intentionally designed institutional 
change to prevent co-destruction from the loss of people's trust in 
political system, under the beliefs that it would provide benefits to 
each party. 
However, as the recent theories of new institutionalism suggest, 
the results of the institutional change may differ from the intended 
results. Even if the intentional and strategic aspects of human 
behavior are acknowledged, these intentions and strategies still 
only have meaning in the institutional context, and the institution is 
formed and deepened in unequal power relations. In addition, 
because the system is designed and changed by the interactions and 
conflicts between various intentions, the results of the institutional 
change produce not only intentional results but also unintended 
ones. Moreover, since the institution is not created in a vacuum, but 
is designed and changed in the existing institutional framework, the 
extent to which human intention can affect is limited (Ha, Yeon-
seop, 2011) 
The introduction of BAIS was designed to abide by the 
constitutional deadline of the budget passage and encourage the 
parties to reach consensus on the budget by November 30, the 
deadline for the comprehensive deliberation. However, the theories 
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of institutional change imply that the introduction of BAIS may have 
different results from the originally intended consequences due to 
the influence of existing budget deliberation practices and 
institutions, and changes in power relations between parties and 
government. 
 
2.2.4. Precedent studies on the impact of changes in 
the budget institutions of the National Assembly and 
the introduction of BAIS  
 
2.2.4.1. Introduction of precedent studies 
 
Several studies have examined empirically the impact of 
changes in the budget institutions of the National Assembly, such as 
making the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts operate 
year-round or the establishment of National Assembly Budget 
Office on budget deliberation. 
Kim Nan-young & Kim Sang-hun (2007) conducted empirical 
study of the effect of making the Special Committee on Budget and 
Accounts operate year-round in 2000. The reform was expected to 
make the budget deliberation more faithful and to strengthen the 
control of the budget by the National Assembly. However, the result 
of the study suggests that the reform has no effect or a negative 
effect on the total revision rate, the net revision rate and the 
number of days overdue after the legal budget deadline. The study 
concluded that the reform did not work out as expected.  
Kim Sang-hun & Lee Ki-young (2011) investigated whether 
the establishment of the National Assembly Budget Office tended to 
increase or decrease the amount of budget in the budget 
deliberation process. The result of the study was that the degree of 
revision to the budget by the National Assembly was not significant 
even after the establishment of the National Assembly Budget 
Office. The study concluded the past practices of poor budget 
deliberation have continued even after the establishment of it.  
Jung Jong-Sun (2016) pointed out that the research of Kim 
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Sang-Hun and Lee Ki-Young (2011) had a limitation that it was 
conducted without controlling other factors except for the 
establishment of the National Assembly Budget Office that could 
affect the budget revision ratio of the National Assembly. The study 
analyzed the effects of establishing the National Assembly Budget 
Office on the budget deliberation controlling other factors that could 
affect the revision rate of the draft budget. The result of the study 
was that the establishment of the National Assembly Budget Office 
has the expected effect of reinforcing the budget deliberation of the 
National Assembly. 
There have been several articles that discussed the influence of 
the introduction of BAIS on the budget deliberation of the National 
Assembly. Most of the precedent studies argued that the 
introduction of BAIS would further weaken the feeble power of the 
National Assembly on the budget deliberation. 
Park, Gyeong-cheol (2012) evaluated BAIS as a system 
favorable to the ruling party in that it can enhance the efficiency of 
the budget deliberation and prevent the opposition party from using 
the draft budget as the negotiation tool. Kim Jin-young (2014) 
pointed out that BAIS can cause poor budget deliberation of 
National Assembly due to the shortened period of deliberation. Jeon 
Jin-young (2015) discussed that BAIS weakened the control power 
on public finance of National Assembly and handed over the 
initiative of the budget deliberation process to the government. 
On the other hand, Jeong Jin-woong (2018) pointed out that 
the effectiveness of BAIS can vary depending on the distribution of 
seats in the National Assembly, and in some cases, the impact of 
the introduction of BAIS may not be meaningful. If the ruling party 
has a majority, BAIS is a favorable system for the government and 
the ruling party, but in the case of the divided government where 
the ruling party has not secured a majority seat, the study 
evaluated that BAIS is not favorable to the government and ruling 
party because they have to reach an agreement with the opposition 
party to pass the draft budget at the plenary session.  
 Recently, Na, Chae-sik (2019) analyzed the changes in the 
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absolute value of the net revision ratio after the introduction of 
BAIS, and concluded that there was a statistically significant 
decrease in the absolute value of the net revision ratio. In addition, 
the study conducted a qualitative analysis through in-depth 
interviews with the National Assembly staffs of the committees, the 
representatives＇staffs and government budget officials to find out 
the impact of the introduction of BAIS. The result of the interview 
found that BAIS had the effect of weakening the government＇s 
responsiveness to the National Assembly and National Assembly＇s 
negotiating power to the government as the practice has been 
established to comply with the statutory deadline. 
 
2.2.4.2. Differentiation from precedent studies 
 
Park, Kyung-cheol (2012), Kim, Jin-young (2014), and Jeon, 
Jin-young (2014) presented meaningful predictions based on 
existing political culture and practices on the influence of the 
introduction of BAIS, but these studies did not provide any 
empirical evidence to support their arguments. This study is 
different from the studies mentioned above in that it analyzed the 
effects of BAIS based on various empirical data including budget 
deliberation data of the Special Committee on the Budget and 
Accounts and the plenary session. 
 Jeong Jin-woong (2018) had limitations in that its analysis 
periods were limited to just three years from 2014 to 2016, and it 
focused only on whether the statutory deadline of budget passage 
was followed when it analyzed the impact of introduction of BAIS. 
On the other hand, this study expanded the scope of analysis to ten 
years from 2009 to 2018, and analyzed the effects of BAIS in 
various aspects, including the budget deliberation power of the 
National Assembly, the budget deliberation period, the number of 
meetings, and the impact on the functions of the Special Committee 
on the Budget and Accounts. 
Na, Chae-sik (2019) analyzed the impact of the introduction of 
BAIS on the net revision rate of the draft budget under the 
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jurisdiction of each standing committee through statistical 
techniques, but the scope of the budget to be analyzed was limited 
to general and special accounts, while this study would identify the 
changes in the budget more comprehensively using the concept of 
Total Spending which includes not only general and special accounts 
but also national funds. In addition, while Na, Chae-sik (2019) 
analyzed changes in the net revision rate which means the ratio of 
the difference between the draft budget and the final budget passed 
by the National Assembly to the draft budget as a dependent 
variable, this study would identify changes in the ability of the 
National Assembly to change the spending priority in the draft 
budget by using the total revision rate which means the ratio of the 
absolute figure of the sum of reduced and increased amounts in the 




Chapter 3. Research design and Research Method  
 
3.1. Research Questions 
 
The purpose of this research is to determine the influence of 
BAIS on the power of the National Assembly to revise the draft 
budget and on the practice of budget deliberations. In this regard, 
this research would develop four research questions. 
 
First, to figure out the impact of BAIS on the budget 
deliberation power of the National Assembly this research develops 
a research question as follows;  
 
Research Question 1: Does BAIS weaken the authority of the 
National Assembly to revise the draft budget? 
As mentioned above, since 2014 the government and ruling 
party can allay their concern about the provisional budget thanks to 
BAIS which breaks the impasse over the draft budget in the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts. This consequently gives an 
advantage to the government and ruling party in the negotiation on 
budget deliberation while reducing the bargaining power of the 
opposition party. Since the ruling party can reflect its budget 
demand in the draft budget of the government, the opposition party 
usually takes the lead in the revision of the draft budget during the 
budget deliberation. Therefore, weakened bargaining power of the 
opposition party could lead to a decline in the authority of the 
National Assembly to revise the draft budget. 
Jeon Jin-Young (2015) discussed that BAIS weakened the 
control power on public finance by the National Assembly and 
handed over the initiative of the budget process to the government. 
Park, Kyung Chul (2012) evaluated BAIS as a favorable system to 
the ruling party in that it can enhance the efficiency of the budget 
deliberation and prevent the opposition party from using the draft 




Next, to find out the impact of BAIS on the practices of the 
budget deliberation of the National Assembly this research raises 
three research questions as follows;  
 
Research Question 2: Does BAIS hasten the passage of the 
draft budget? 
Before BAIS, the draft budget was usually passed at the end of 
the year, due to the delaying strategy of the opposition party in the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, as a means to enhance 
its bargaining power. However, BAIS, which obligates the draft 
budget to immediately refer to the plenary session on December 1st 
when the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts does not 
complete the review by November 30, could hasten the passage of 
the budget by preventing the delaying strategy of the opposition 
party and breaking the impasse in the Special Committee on Budget 
and Accounts. 
 
Research Question 3: Does BAIS reduce the period of the 
budget deliberation and the number of meetings for the budget 
deliberation? 
Hastening the passage of the draft budget by BAIS could reduce 
the period of the budget deliberation and the number of meetings 
for the budget deliberation, which could lead to poor budget 
deliberation. A decrease in time spent on the budget will cause a 
less intensive review of key budget items, resulting in a worse 
budget than if adequate time had been given. 
 
Research Question 4: Did BAIS incapacitate the function of the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts? 
BAIS can act as a mechanism to promote compromise in the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, or to hinder it. The 
opposition party, afraid of the situation that its budget needs are not 
reflected in the final budget at all, may actively pursue a 
compromise with the ruling party before December 1st when BAIS 
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is in effect. On the other hand, the ruling party and government in 
no hurry may attempt to skip the comprehensive deliberation and 
finalize the budget in the plenary session. In this case, they would 
negotiate passively with the opposition party in the comprehensive 
deliberation process and just kill time by November 30, which 
means the incapacitation of the Special Committee on Budget and 
Accounts, and the transfer of the budget decision power to the 
plenary session and a small number of party leaders. Jeon Jin-
young (2015) anticipated that the introduction of BAIS would 
incapacitate the budget deliberation power of the Special Committee 
on Budget and Accounts.  
The transfer of budget decision power from the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts to the plenary session may 
bring about a substantial effect beyond simply changing the decision 
maker. Because most of the draft budgets are finalized at the 
plenary session as confirmed by the Special Committee on Budget 
and Accounts, the committee had played the most important role in 
the budget deliberation process (Kim, Nan-young and Kim Sang-
hun, 2007). If the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts loses 
the power to finalize the budget after the implementation of BAIS, 
the influence of the members of the committee on the budget 
deliberation would be reduced, but the influence of the party 
leadership would increase (Yoo Seh-hwan, 2013). In this case, the 
expertise and experience of the committee members accumulated 
during the comprehensive deliberation period can be ignored. In 
addition, the budget’s political characteristic as a bargaining tool to 
resolve other political issues would be strengthened and the 
transparency of the budget deliberation would reduce as the budget 
decision power was transferred to the hands of a few political 
leaders with low expertise. 
This is because the negotiation process between the party 
leaders at the plenary session is thoroughly conducted in behind 
closed doors and produce no record while all meetings of the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts produce  
stenographic records and release them to the public. Low 
 
 ２７ 
transparency can degrade the legislator's accountability to the 
general public and deepen Principal-Agent problem. The rationality 
of budget decisions would be hindered if logrolling and political 
settlement take precedence over public interests when legislators 
allocate budget resources (Yoo, Seh-hwan, 2013). Moreover, the 
initiative of the government in the budget deliberation process can 
be reinforced because the government have only to deal with a 
small number of party leaders rather than fifty of the committee 
members. In this regard, whether the budget decision power of the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts was transferred to a 
few political party leaders after the introduction of BAIS can have a 
substantial impact on the rationality and transparency of the budget 




In this research the factor that caused institutional change is 
the implementation of BAIS. According to the supplementary 
provision of the revised National Assembly Act in 2012, BAIS was 
implemented on May 30, 2014. Therefore, BAIS has been applied 
from the budget deliberation in 2014. 
 
3.2.1. Measuring results of institutional change 
 
3.2.1.1. The change in the authority of the National 
Assembly to revise the draft budget 
 
Kim Nan-young and Kim Sang-hun (2007), Kim Sang-hun and 
Lee Ki-young (2011), and Jung Jong-sun (2016) have used the 
revisions in “the general accounts or the special accounts” as 
indicators to estimate the changes in the influence of the National 
Assembly on the budget deliberation. However, the revisions in the 
general accounts or the special accounts have limitations because 
inter-account transaction expenditures and internal transfers 
between accounts and funds are included, but the expenditure of 
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national funds, which are major financial resources of the 
government is left out. 
On the other hand, Total Spending, which includes both the 
budget and the funds is calculated by subtracting inter-account 
transaction expenditures, inter-fund transaction expenditures, 
expenditures from internal transfers between accounts and funds, 
and expenditures for financing from each account and fund from the 
sum of the general account, special accounts, and funds (Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea, 2014). Therefore, 
Total Spending best explains the actual financial activities of the 
central government on the national economy. In this regard, this 
study would estimate the degree of the authority of the National 
Assembly to revise the draft budget based on Total Spending. 
The National Assembly can revise the draft budget in two ways. 
First, it can increase or decrease overall spending. Second, it can 
alter spending priorities by shifting spending from some items to 
other items in the budget. To capture these two different types of 
power of the National Assembly to revise the draft budget, two 
indicators can be used (Mayer & Naka, 1998): 
 
The net revision rate = (The finalized budget – The draft 
budget) / The draft budget 
The total revision rate = (│∑Decreased amount│+∑Increased 
amount) /The draft budget 
 
First, “the net revision rate” (NRR) means the ratio of the 
difference between the draft budget and the final budget passed by 
the National Assembly to the draft budget, which demonstrates the 
ability of the National Assembly to increase or reduce overall 
spending. Second, “the total revision rate” (TRR) means the ratio of 
the absolute figure of the sum of reduced and increased amounts in 
the budget deliberation to the draft budget, which demonstrates the 
ability of the National Assembly to change the spending priority in 
the draft budget. In TRR, the absolute values of budget-item-
spending changes are summed; decreases in spending do not offset 
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increases in spending (Mayer & Naka, 1998).8 
According to Kim Sang-Hun and Lee Ki-Young (2011), the 
average NRR between 1982 and 2010 was only -0.49%, which 
shows that the National Assembly has little ability to increase or 
reduce overall spending. The National Assembly usually has 
increased spending within the extent that it has cut because article 
57 of the Korean Constitution restricts the National Assembly from 
increasing spending or from creating a new budget item without the 
consent of the government. Due to the restriction from the 
Constitution, the budget deliberation of the National Assembly has 
placed emphasis on changing the spending priority in the draft 
budget rather than changing the overall size of expenditure. In this 
regard, this research will use TRR as an indicator to capture “the 
degree of the authority of the National Assembly to revise the draft 
budget”. 
However, TRR, calculated by simply adding all increased and 
reduced amounts together, also has a limitation because some 
reductions and increases are not actually made by the National 
Assembly, or related to changing spending priority. Several budget 
programs are reduced on a large scale almost every year: (1) the 
Government Bond Interest Payment, (2) the Reserve Fund of the 
General Account, and (3) the Direct Payment for Rice Income 
Compensation9 . For the last ten years (2009~2018), the annual 
average reduction in these three programs was 1.8 trillion Korean 
Won (KRW), which accounts for 41.5% of the total budget reduction. 
The budget of these three programs has been excessively 
drawn up on purpose by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(MOSF) to make a “buffer” to meet the demand of the National 
                                            
8 For example, suppose that the National Assembly increases spending on 
the draft budget item by 100,000 Korean Won (KRW) and decreased 
spending on another draft budget item by 100,000 KRW. The net revision is 
measured as 0, but the total revision is measured as 200,000 KRW. This 
change of 200,000 KRW reflects the amount by which the National 
Assembly altered the budget priorities of the draft budget. 
9  The Direct Payment for Rice Income Compensation is provided directly to 
farms to guarantee income and stabilize business of rice farms. 
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Assembly for the budget increase while other programs remain 
intact. It is reasonable to exclude the reductions of these three 
programs in the calculation of TRRs, since these reductions 
“provided by MOSF” are not actually made by the National 
Assembly. 
 
<Table 3-1> Yearly reduced budget programs 
(Unit: Million KRW, %) 
Year 






























2009 1,067,860 200,000 0 1,267,860 3,204,335 39.6 
2010 800,547 100,000 108,600 1,009,147 2,571,787 39.2 
2011 1,268,500 400,000 400,000 2,068,500 3,949,337 52.4 
2012 1,604,837 600,000 300,000 2,504,837 4,910,323 51.0 
2013 1,461,274 1,798,900 85,000 3,345,174 5,404,577 61.9 
2014 1,460,186 500,000 151,217 2,111,403 4,919,212 42.9 
2015 1,683,497 500,000 0 2,183,497 3,828,058 57.0 
2016 691,221 500,000 0 1,191,221 5,567,523 21.4 
2017 699,988 0 410,000 1,109,988 4,325,139 25.7 
2018 900,233 0 324,200 1,224,433 5,224,760 23.4 
Average 1,163,814 459,890 177,902 1,801,606 4,390,505 41.5 
 
In addition, there are some budget transfers between ministries 
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without making any change in the size or plan of the program. For 
example, in 2014, the housing benefit budget of 1 trillion KRW 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Land and Transportation 
was transferred to the Ministry of Health and Welfare. In this case, 
it was shown that the National Assembly revised 2 trillion KRW 
(reduction of 1 trillion KRW + increase of 1 trillion KRW) although 
the National Assembly did not make any change in spending priority. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude simple budget transfers in 
the calculation of TRRs to accurately indicate the ability of the 
National Assembly to change the spending priority in the draft 
budget. To sum up, this research project will exclude reductions in 
the three programs mentioned above, and simple budget transfers 
that do not change budget priority when calculating TRRs. 
 
3.2.1.2. Change in the passage date of the draft budget 
in the plenary session 
 
To capture the degree of hastening the passage of the draft 
budget in the plenary session, this research would use “the passage 
gap” calculated by subtracting the legal deadline (December 2nd) 
from the date when the draft budget was actually passed as the 
indicator. For example, if the draft budget was passed on December 
2, the value of the indicator is 0 and if the draft budget was passed 
on December 31, the value of the indicator is 29. The lower the 
number, the faster the draft budget was passed. Each year’s date of 
the passage of the draft budget in the plenary session can be found 
in Bill Information System of the National Assembly 
(http://likms.assembly.go.kr). 
 
3.2.1.3. The period of the budget deliberation and the 
number of meetings for the budget deliberation 
 
This research would define each year’s period of the budget 
deliberation as the period from the date the draft budget was 
referred to the Special Committee on the Budget and Accounts to 
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the date of the budget decision of the Special Committee on the 
Budget and Accounts (If the draft budget was automatically 
introduced to the plenary session, automatically introduced date is 
used). Also, this research will define the number of meetings for 
the budget deliberation as the number of meetings for “the 
comprehensive deliberation” in the Special Committee on the Budget 
and Accounts including the comprehensive policy questioning 
session, the departmental evaluation and the meeting of the budget 
adjustment subcommittee. 
The date the draft budget was referred to the Special 
Committee on the Budget and Accounts, its decision date, and the 
number of meetings of the Special Committee on the Budget and 
Accounts are described in the Manual of the Special Committee on 
the Budget and Accounts. The reason only Comprehensive 
Deliberation is considered in calculating the period of the budget 
deliberation and the number of meetings for the budget deliberation 
is that the extent and details of the changes to the draft budget are 
mostly decided in the comprehensive deliberation.  
 
3.2.1.4. Whether the budget decision power of the 
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts was 
incapacitated 
 
This study would determine whether the budget deliberation 
power of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts has been 
incapacitated by the introduction of BAIS according to the following 
criteria; 
“Did the committee decide the amendment to the draft budget 
before December 1st, or was the draft budget automatically 
introduced to the plenary session on December 1st without deciding 
the amendment to the draft budget in the committee?” 
If BAIS acted as a mechanism to promote the compromise 
between the parties in the Special Committee on Budget and 
Accounts, the committee would determine the revised budget by 
November 30, and it would be evaluated that the committee 
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maintains its role of confirming the total amount and details of the 
budget in spite of BAIS. On the other hand, if the government and 
ruling party use the delaying strategy, the draft budget would be 
automatically introduced to the plenary session without any 
revisions and it would be evaluated that the function of the 
committee is incapacitated. 
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3.2.2. Collecting Data 
 
This project research would use data from each year’s: -
deliberation reports of the Special Committee on the Budget and 
Accounts, budget amendments in the plenary session, Bill 
Information System of the National Assembly 
(http://likms.assembly.go.kr) and Manual of the Special Committee 
on the Budget and Accounts. The Deliberation Report of the Special 
Committee on the Budget and Accounts is a document produced by 
the committee to report its activities and the result of its budget 
deliberations to the plenary session after finishing its 
Comprehensive Deliberation. Since it contains the progress of the 
budget deliberation, the proposal of the government, the review on 
the draft budget conducted by the head expert member of the 
National Assembly, and the amendment to the draft budget, the 
details of the revision in Total Spending can be found in it.  
However, when the draft budget is automatically introduced to 
the plenary session without the decision of the Special Committee 
on the Budget and Accounts, (like the 2014~2018 budget 
deliberation), the Deliberation Report of the Special Committee on 
the Budget and Accounts is not produced. In this case, an 
examination of “Budget Amendment in the Plenary Session” will be 
done to identify the details of the revision in Total Spending. 
The date of passage of the draft budget in the plenary session 
and whether the draft budget was automatically introduced to the 
plenary session can be found in the Bill Information System of the 
National Assembly. The date of referring the draft budget to the 
Special Committee on the Budget and Accounts and its decision date, 
and the number of meetings of the Special Committee on the Budget 
and Accounts are described in the Manual of the Special Committee 
on the Budget and Accounts. 
 
3.2.3. Procedure of Analysis 
 
First, this research will collect and analyze each year’s budget 
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deliberation data from 2009 to 2018. This research will find the 
common patterns of budget deliberations during 2009~2013 (before 
the implementation of BAIS) and those of budget deliberations 
during 2014~2018 (on and after BAIS). These patterns will be 
explained in terms of the results of institutional change and 
indicators mentioned above. Lastly, this research will analyze how 
and why common patterns of the budget deliberations during 2014-
2018 change after the implementation of BAIS by comparing them 
with those from 2009 to 2013. 
 
<Figure 3-2> Procedure of Analysis 
Collecting Data 
   
Analyzing each year’s budget deliberation (2009~2018) 








Analyzing the change in patterns  
and finding implications 
 
 
3.2.4. Strengths and weaknesses of Analysis 
 
The strength of this analysis is that it will examine the impact 
of BAIS on the budget deliberation of the National Assembly in 
various aspects. These include changes in TRR, the period of the 
budget deliberation, the number of meetings for the budget 
deliberation, and the passage date of the draft budget in the plenary 
session based on empirical data. Furthermore, this analysis method 
can accurately capture the ability of the National Assembly to 
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change the spending priority in the draft budget by excluding 
revisions that are not actually made by the National Assembly, or 
related to changing spending priority when calculating TRRs. 
On the other hand, this research has a weakness in terms of 
internal validity. This research traces the change in TRR before and 
after the implementation of BAIS without controlling other factors 
that can affect TRR other than the implementation of BAIS, which 
can cause omitted variable bias. Because it has been only five years 
since BAIS was implemented, it is difficult to obtain sufficient time 





Chapter 4. Result of the research 
 
4.1. The change in the authority of the National 
Assembly to revise the draft budget 
 
Observing TRR trends from 2009 to 2013 (Phase 1), before the 
implementation of BAIS, TRRs were placed between 1.2% and 2.1%. 
The annual average TRR of “Phase 1” was 1.7%.  
The period from 2014 to 2017, after the implementation of 
BAIS, can be separated into two phases according to whether the 
ruling party has the majority. In “Phase 2” from 2014 to 2015 when 
the ruling party had the majority, TRR dropped to 1.3% indicating 
that the authority of the National Assembly to revise the draft 
budget had weakened provided that the ruling party has a majority. 
However, “Phase 3” from 2016 to 2018 when the ruling party failed 
to achieve majority seats, TRR has risen up to 2.4%. The average 
TRR of Phase 3 was 1.9%, which is 0.6%p higher than 1.3% of the 




<Table 4-1> 2009∼2018 each year’s TRR 

























2009 1.9 4.2 6.1 291.8 2.1% 57.5% 
2010 1.5  2.1 3.6 309.6 1.2% 57.6% 
2011 1.9 3.2 5.1 326.1 1.6% 57.3% 
2012 2.4 4.4 6.8 342.5 2.0% 51.5% 





2014 1.6 3.2 4.8 376 1.3% 53.6% 
2015 1.7 3.5 5.2 386.7 1.3% 53.4% 
Phase 
3 
2016 4.4 5.4 9.8 400.7 2.4% 42.7% 
2017 3.2 4.2 7.4 429.0 1.7% 38.9% 
2018 3.4 4.3 7.7 470.5 1.6% 43.1% 
 





















The changes in TRR between Phases 2 and 3 after the 
implementation of BAIS can be attributed to changes in the seats of 
the ruling party. If the ruling party holds the majority seats as in 
2014 and 2015, it can decide the budget alone in the plenary 
session without additional negotiation with the opposite party. This 
leads to the weaker the budgetary power of the National Assembly 
than before.  
On the other hand, if the ruling party fails to secure a majority 
of seats as from 2016 to 2018, even if the draft budget is 
automatically introduced to the plenary session on December 1, the 
ruling party has to resume negotiations with the opposition party to 
pass the budget. In this case, BAIS cannot make a significant 
difference in the authority of the National Assembly to revise the 
draft budget since the budgetary demand of the opposition party 
should be reflected in the plenary session. 
In conclusion, the authority of the National Assembly to revise 
the draft budget depends on the distribution of seats in the National 
Assembly. In other words, if the ruling party has a majority, as 
discussed by Jeon Jin-Young (2015), BAIS can weaken the power 
of the National Assembly over public finance. However, if the ruling 
party fails to win a majority, it can be concluded that BAIS merely 
changes the venue for negotiation from the Special Committee on 
Budget and Accounts to the plenary session. 
Surely, other explanation may also be available for the higher 
TRRs in Phase 3 than those of Phase 2. 2014 and 2015 were the 
first half of the term of the President Park Geun-hye who took 
office in February 2013. She might have been able to make the 
National Assembly to pass the draft budget with little revisions 
using her powerful influence based on her high popularity. However, 
as she lost her power due to the impeachment in December 2016, 
the National Assembly might have been able to revise the draft 
budget on a large scale. In other words, the impact of the 
introduction of BAIS on the budget deliberation authority of the 
National Assembly may have been different depending on the 
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president's power in state affairs and the progress of his/her term 
of office. 
 But this hypothesis cannot explain the fact that TRRs (1.7% 
and 1.6%) in 2017 and 2018 were higher than those in Phase 2 
(1.3%) despite the president Moon Jae-in took office in May 2017 
with high approval ratings. If the impact of the introduction of BAIS 
on the budget deliberation authority of the National Assembly is 
different depending on the president's power in state affairs and the 
progress of his/her term of office, it is implausible that TRRs in 
2017 and 2018, the first and the second year of the president Moon 
Jae-in’s term, are higher than those in 2014 and 2015, the second 
and third year of the president Park Geun-hye's term. 
 The effect of the proportion of seats on the budget deliberation 
authority of the National Assembly after the introduction of BAIS 
needs to be further verified by using statistical analysis methods 
while controlling other factors that may affect the budget 
deliberation authority of the National Assembly. 
 
4.2. Change in the passage date of the draft budget in 
the plenary session 
 
Looking at the passage date of the draft budget in the plenary 
session between 2009 and 2013, before the implementation of BAIS, 
the legal deadline is violated every year on a large scale. Especially, 
in 2012 and 2013, the draft budget was passed on the start date of 
the fiscal year (January 1st). Conversely, in 2014, the first year of 
the implementation of BIAS, the legal deadline was obeyed, and 
after 2015, the legal deadline has been violated again but the 
passage gaps were just from one to six days. This indicates a clear 
effect of BAIS on the advancement of the budget passage. 
It should be noted, however, that the passage gap has slightly 
increased since the implementation of BAIS. If the ruling party fails 
to win a majority and the deadlock persists even after the draft 
budget is introduced to the plenary session, the delayed budget 
passage can recur as hitherto. 
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2009 2009.12.2 2009.12.31 29 
2010 2010.12.2 2010.12.8 6 
2011 2011.12.2 2011.12.31 29 
2012 2012.12.2 2013.1.1 30 
2013 2013.12.2 2014.1.1 30 
After BAIS 
2014 2014.12.2 2014.12.2 0 
2015 2015.12.2 2015.12.3 1 
2016 2016.12.2 2016.12.3 1 
2017 2017.12.2 2017.12.6 4 
2018 2017.12.2 2018. 12. 8 6 
 






















4.3. The period of the budget deliberation and the 
number of meetings for the budget deliberation 
 
The annual average deliberation period from 2009 to 2013, 
before the implementation of BAIS, was 39.4 days. On the other 
hand, the period reduced to 29.2 days (-25.9%) on average after 
the implementation of BAIS as the comprehensive deliberation 
process was automatically terminated on November 30. 
However, the average number of meetings of comprehensive 
deliberation after the implementation of BAIS (14.8) is slightly 
higher than the number before the implementation (14.2). The table 
below shows that the number of meetings of the comprehensive 
deliberation decreased somewhat in 2014 and 2015, but after 2016, 
the number of meetings has recovered to the pre-implementation 
level. This can be interpreted as an adaptation to the shortened 
deliberation period by advancing the start date of the 
comprehensive deliberation and shortening the time between 
meetings. As a consequence, empirical evidence does not seem to 
support the argument that BAIS causes poor budget deliberation of 



















2009 12.7 12.31 25 10 
2010 11.17 12.8 22 13 
2011 11.7 12.31 55 15 
2012 10.31 12.31 62 16 
2013 11.29 12.31 33 17 
After 
BAIS 
2014 11.6 11.30 25 13 
2015 10.28 11.30 34 12 
2016 10.26 11.30 36 18 
2017 11.6 11.30 25 15 
2018 11.5 11.30 26 16 
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4.4. Whether the budget decision power of the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts was incapacitated 
 
According to the results of the budget deliberation from 2009 to 
2013, prior to the implementation of BIAS, every draft budgets 
were decided in the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts and 
passed in the plenary session as the committee decided. On the 
other hand, after BAIS was implemented in 2014, all draft budgets 
were not decided in the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts 
and introduced automatically to the plenary session. The draft 
budgets automatically introduced were revised in the plenary 
session. This result means that BAIS did not function at all as a 
mechanism to facilitate compromise between the ruling and 
opposition parties, and that the budget decision power of the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts was incapacitated after the 
implementation of BAIS. The implementation of BAIS is likely to 
have undermined the transparency and rationality of the budget 
deliberation as the draft budget has been subject to secret 
negotiations between a handful of party leaders and government at 




<Table 4-4> Whether the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts decided the draft budget 
 
Year Whether the Special Committee on Budget and 















Chapter 5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of this research can be summarized as follows: first, 
unlike the arguments of precedent studies that the implementation 
of BAIS will weaken the authority of the National Assembly to 
revise the budget, this research found that the effect of BAIS on the 
budgetary authority of the National Assembly may vary depending 
on the seat distribution. If the ruling party holds a majority, BAIS 
can weaken the budget deliberation authority. In contrast, if the 
ruling party fails to win a majority, BAIS does not have a significant 
effect on the power of the National Assembly to revise the budget. 
Second, although the timing of the budget passage has 
drastically accelerated since the implementation of BAIS, the 
National Assembly is still violating the legal deadline.  
Third, although BAIS has shortened the deliberation period, it 
does not seem to have caused a significant change in the number of 
meetings of the comprehensive deliberation. There is not enough 
empirical evidence to support the argument that shortening of the 
deliberation period due to BAIS causes poor budget deliberation. 
Forth, this research identified that the function of the Special 
Committee on Budget and Accounts has been incapacitated since 
the implementation of BAIS, in that the decision power on the draft 
budget has been transferred from the Committee to the plenary 
session. As this research discussed earlier, this power transfer can 
bring about the deterioration in the transparency and rationality of 
the budget deliberation.   
To sum up, BAIS can be evaluated to have a certain positive 
effect in that it has advanced the budget passage date. However, 
except for 2014, the first year of the implementation of BAIS, the 
legal deadline is continuously disobeyed, and the passage gap has 
gradually increased since the implementation of BAIS. In other 
words, although the BAIS has advanced the passage of the draft 
budget, it is still unable to make the National Assembly to meet the 
legal deadline. Furthermore, if the deadlock is sustained after the 
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draft budget is introduced to the plenary session, the budget 
passage may be delayed again to the end of the year as in the past. 
Thus, the positive effect of the introduction of BAIS is very limited, 
while its side effects seem to be significant. 
In the case that the ruling party can secure a majority of seats 
in 2014 and 2015, as the incentive of the ruling party to respect the 
opposite party’s opinions had been reduced, the budget deliberation 
authority of the National Assembly and its function to check the 
executive branch in terms of the public finance had been weakened. 
When the ruling party failed to hold a majority of seats, as in 2016, 
2017 and 2018, BAIS did not seem to have much impact on the 
budget deliberation authority of the National Assembly, but it 
caused some side effects that have hampered the transparency and 
rationality of the budget deliberation as it incapacitated the function 
of the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts and made the 
draft budget to be determined through informal, closed-door 
negotiations. 
In order to mitigate the negative impact of BIAS, it is necessary 
for each party to comply with the constitutional deadline, and 
establish additional institutional mechanism to strengthen the 
reflection of the minority parties’ opinions in the budget deliberation 
process. In addition, it is necessary to discuss means to ensure 
transparency and rationality in the budget deliberation when the 
draft budget is automatically referred to the plenary session, such 
as forming an extra official conference organization for deliberation 
and negotiation between party leaders in the stage of the plenary 
session. 
In the long run, abolishing BAIS and the constitutional 
restriction that keeps the National Assembly from increasing 
spending or creating a new budget item without the consent of the 
government are worth considering to strengthen the power of the 
National Assembly over public finance and ensure checks and 
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“예산안의 본회의 자동부의제”의 
도입이 국회예산심사에 미친 영향 
 
서정덕 




2012년 국회에서의 물리적 충돌을 방지하고 정당간의 협치와 
타협을 촉진하기 위하여 지난 2012년 국회법이 개정(이른바 
“국회선진화법”)되었음. 2012년의 국회법 개정사항 중 국회의 예산안 
심사와 관련된 가장 중요한 개정사항은 “예산안 자동부의제(BAIS)”의 
도입이었음. BAIS 시행 이전(2013년 이전)에는 예결위의 예산안 
종합심사가 연도말까지 지속되는 사례가 잦았으며, 이는 예산안 심사를 
12월 2일까지 마치도록 하고 있는 헌법 제54조제2항을 위배하는 
것이었음. 이러한 헌법 위반문제를 해소하기 위하여 BAIS는 예결위가 
11월 30일까지 예산안 심사를 마치지 않는 경우 12월 1일에 예산안이 
자동으로 본회의로 부의되도록 하였음. 
 BAIS의 도입은 야당의 협상력을 저하시킴으로써 국회의 
예산안심사권을 약화시킬 것으로 예상되어왔음. 2014년 이후로 정부와 
여당은 BAIS 도입으로 인해 더 이상 준예산 편성 가능성을 우려할 
필요가 적어졌고, 이는 예산안 협상과정에서 정부와 야당에 유리하게 
작용할 수 있다는 것임. 
이 연구는 2009년부터 2018년간 예결위 예산안 심사보고서와 
본회의 예산안 수정안 등의 실증자료를 바탕으로 하여 BAIS가 국회의 
예산수정권한과 예산안 심사행태(예산안 통과시점, 예산안 심사의 
충실도 및 예결위의 기능)를 어떻게 변화시켰는지 분석하였음.  
연구결과 BAIS는 예산안통과시점을 상당히 앞당기기는 하였으나, 
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BAIS 도입이후에도 국회는 여전히 법정기한을 준수하지 못하고 있는 
것으로 나타남. 자동부의 이후 본회의에서의 교착상태가 지속되는 
경우에는 BAIS 도입 이전과 같이 예산안 통과가 연말까지 지연될 
가능성도 배제하기 어려울 것으로 보임. 이처럼 BAIS 도입에 따른 
긍정적인 효과는 상당히 제한적인 반면 그에 따른 부작용은 결코 적지 
않은 것으로 판단됨. 
2014년과 2015년과 같이 여당이 단독으로 과반의석을 확보할 수 
있는 경우에는 여당이 야당의 의견을 존중할 유인이 약화됨에 따라 
국회의 예산수정권한이 대폭 축소되고 국가재정과 관련된 국회의 
행정부에 대한 견제기능이 무력화되는 문제가 있음. 2016년에서 
2018년과 같이 여당이 과반의석을 점유하지 못하는 경우에는 BAIS가 
국회의 예산수정권한에 큰 영향을 미치지 못한 것으로 보이나, 예결위의 
기능이 무력화되고 비공식적인 밀실 협상을 통해 예산안이 결정되도록 
함에 따라 예산안 심사의 투명성과 합리성이 저해될 우려가 높은 것으로 
보임. 
BIAS 도입에 따른 부정적인 영향을 완화하기 위해서는 각 정당이 
헌법상 법정기한을 준수하기 위하여 노력할 필요가 있으며 예산안 
심사과정에서 소수정당의 의견 반영을 강화하기 위한 추가적인 제도적 
장치를 마련할 필요가 있음. 또한, 예산안이 본회의에 부의되는 
경우에도 정당지도부간의 추가적인 심사와 협상과정을 별도의 공식 
회의체를 통해 진행하도록 하는 등 자동부의시 예산안 심사의 투명성 
확보 방안을 강구할 필요가 있음. 국회의 예산안 심사권한을 강화하고 
국가재정과 관련된 의회와 행정부간의 견제와 균형을 확보하기 위해서는 
장기적으로 BAIS와 헌법상 증액동의권을 폐지하는 방안도 검토할 만 
할 것으로 보임. 
